BIOGRAPHY
I am the Stirek Assistant Professor of Finance at Oregon State University. My empirical research is at the intersection of information economics and corporate governance. I have a Ph.D. in Finance from Penn State’s Smeal College of Business. Prior to attending Penn State, I worked as an equity research analyst at Credit Suisse in New York City. There, I covered companies in the industrial conglomerate (e.g. GE, Honeywell) and large-cap banking (e.g. JP Morgan, Bank of America) sectors. I also have experience working in the debt capital markets division of KeyBanc Capital Markets. I hold a B.B.A in Finance and Business Economics from Ohio University’s Honors Tutorial College.
PUBLICATIONS
Journal of Accounting Research, Forthcoming
Abstract: Complaints from institutional investors suggest that principles-based disclosure regimes that rely on financial materiality standards produce inadequate non-financial environmental and social (E&S) information. Using the staggered introduction of 40 country-level regulations that mandate disclosure, I document that reporting E&S information relates to increased investment from institutional owners and has material effects on firms’ investment and financing decisions. Firms mandated to disclose E&S information allocate more investment towards long-term, innovative projects and raise more equity capital. Evidence indicates that disclosure attracts long-term-oriented institutional clientele with E&S preferences, which then feeds back on firm decision-making. While the effects of non-financial disclosure are similar to those of improved financial disclosure, this clientele mechanism is unique. Taken together, these results suggest that jurisdictions that rely solely on financial materiality disclosure standards create non-financial information frictions with material effects on investors and firm decision-making.
Media Mentions: Columbia Law School’s Blue Sky Blog
Presentations: FMA Annual Meeting 2021
Journal of Financial And Quantitative Analysis. (2023)
Abstract: I study VCs’ use of public market information and how attention to this information relates to private market investment outcomes. I link web traffic to public filings hosted on EDGAR to individual VCs. VCs analyze public information about industry peers before most deals. An increase in industry filing views relates positively to the probability of an exit through acquisition, suggesting that public information helps identify paths to acquisition. The effect is stronger when the VC has less access to private information—especially for low reputation VCs. Policymakers should consider spillover effects on private markets when setting public disclosure requirements.
Media Mentions: National Affairs
with Peter Iliev and Jonathan Kalodimos. Management Science (2021).
Abstract: We identify analysts’ information acquisition patterns by linking EDGAR server activity to analysts’ brokerage houses. Analysts rely on EDGAR in 26% of their estimate updates with an average of eight filings viewed. We document that analysts’ attention to public information is driven by the demand for information and the analysts’ incentives and career concerns. We find that information acquisition via EDGAR is associated with a significant reduction in analysts’ forecasting error relative to their peers. This relationship is likewise present when we focus on the intensity of analyst research. Attention to public information further enables analysts to provide forecasts for more time periods and more financial metrics. Informed recommendation updates are associated with substantial and persistent abnormal returns, even when the analyst accesses historical filings. Analysts’ use of EDGAR is associated with longer and more informative analysis within recommendation reports.
Media Mentions: Citywire
Policy Impact: SEC's Rule 15 under Regulation S-T
WORKING PAPERS
with Golnaz Bahrami. Under Review.
Abstract: The rise in passively managed corporate debt funds has resulted in increasingly inelastic demand for corporate debt. In this study, we quantify how passive debt ownership affects firms’ financial policy. Using fund-specific flows to capture firm-level changes in passive debt ownership that are exogenous to firm fundamentals, we find that firms respond to higher levels of passive debt ownership by increasing leverage. The borrower-friendly terms provided by passive debtholders could theoretically lead to several potential changes in investment or payout policy. We show that passive debt holding does not affect investment policy. Instead, passive ownership predicts increased payouts — exacerbating shareholder-debtholder conflicts. Passive debtholders enable these effects by reducing aggregate ex-ante and ex-post monitoring. The presence of a bank monitor moderates the relationship between passive debt ownership and increased payout, reinforcing the importance of this monitoring channel.
Presentations: FMA Annual Meeting 2020, SFA Annual Meeting 2020
with Franziska Schmid Gibbons and Vesa Pursiainen. Under Review.
Abstract: We investigate whether the disclosure of gender pay information leads consumers to change their purchasing decisions. Using the U.K.'s 2017 mandatory gender pay disclosure regulation, combined with high-frequency foot traffic data to individual retail outlets, we show that foot traffic increases to U.S. outlets of firms required to disclose gender pay practices. Consumers reduce visits to firms reporting the highest gaps and reward firms reporting the lowest gaps with more visits, even if the company reports a pay gap unfavorable to women. Local demographic or workforce characteristics like the relative number of women or women in the labor force do not strengthen this baseline effect. Instead, increases in foot traffic are larger in localities with social norms favoring gender equality. Localities with well-educated consumers are more likely to be skeptical of firms reporting low pay gaps and "see through" misreported data. These foot traffic patterns post-disclosure affect managerial decision-making. We document a feedback loop where changes to consumer behavior following disclosure impact firms' future pay practices. Abnormally low foot traffic is predictive of smaller future pay gaps. Collectively, these findings indicate that transparency and equity in pay distributions can serve as a differentiating factor in a firm's brand image. Likewise, our findings demonstrate the usefulness of regulations mandating disclosure of gender pay gaps in providing customers with information relevant to their decision-making.
Presentations: 2023 Joshua T. Beck Northwest Marketing Research Symposium , 2024 Boca-ECGI Corporate Finance and Governance Conference
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
- Introduction to Finance
- Corporate Finance
- Financial Markets & Institutions
LINKS
OTHER MEDIA MENTIONS
3M Shares Look Cheap, Barron’s
GE Has Limited Earnings Risk, 3M Looks Safe, Barron’s
Four Big Banks for Happy Returns, Barron’s