I am the Stirek Assistant Professor of Finance at Oregon State University. My empirical research is at the intersection of information economics and corporate governance. I have a Ph.D. in Finance from Penn State’s Smeal College of Business. Prior to attending Penn State, I worked as an equity research analyst at Credit Suisse in New York City. There, I covered companies in the industrial conglomerate (e.g. GE, Honeywell) and large-cap banking (e.g. JP Morgan, Bank of America) sectors. I also have experience working in the debt capital markets division of KeyBanc Capital Markets. I hold a B.B.A in Finance and Business Economics from Ohio University’s Honors Tutorial College.


Journal of Accounting Research, Forthcoming

Abstract: Complaints from institutional investors suggest that principles-based disclosure regimes that rely on financial materiality standards produce inadequate non-financial environmental and social (E&S) information. Using the staggered introduction of 40 country-level regulations that mandate disclosure, I document that reporting E&S information relates to increased investment from institutional owners and has material effects on firms’ investment and financing decisions. Firms mandated to disclose E&S information allocate more investment towards long-term, innovative projects and raise more equity capital. Evidence indicates that disclosure attracts long-term-oriented institutional clientele with E&S preferences, which then feeds back on firm decision-making. While the effects of non-financial disclosure are similar to those of improved financial disclosure, this clientele mechanism is unique. Taken together, these results suggest that jurisdictions that rely solely on financial materiality disclosure standards create non-financial information frictions with material effects on investors and firm decision-making. 

Video Synopsis via Faculti

Media Mentions: Columbia Law School’s Blue Sky Blog

Presentations: FMA Annual Meeting 2021 

Journal of Financial And Quantitative Analysis. (2023)

Abstract: I study VCs’ use of public market information and how attention to this information relates to private market investment outcomes. I link web traffic to public filings hosted on EDGAR to individual VCs. VCs analyze public information about industry peers before most deals. An increase in industry filing views relates positively to the probability of an exit through acquisition, suggesting that public information helps identify paths to acquisition. The effect is stronger when the VC has less access to private information—especially for low reputation VCs. Policymakers should consider spillover effects on private markets when setting public disclosure requirements.

Media Mentions: National Affairs

with Peter Iliev and Jonathan Kalodimos. Management Science (2021).

Abstract: We identify analysts’ information acquisition patterns by linking EDGAR server activity to analysts’ brokerage houses. Analysts rely on EDGAR in 26% of their estimate updates with an average of eight filings viewed. We document that analysts’ attention to public information is driven by the demand for information and the analysts’ incentives and career concerns. We find that information acquisition via EDGAR is associated with a significant reduction in analysts’ forecasting error relative to their peers. This relationship is likewise present when we focus on the intensity of analyst research. Attention to public information further enables analysts to provide forecasts for more time periods and more financial metrics. Informed recommendation updates are associated with substantial and persistent abnormal returns, even when the analyst accesses historical filings. Analysts’ use of EDGAR is associated with longer and more informative analysis within recommendation reports.

Media Mentions: Citywire

Policy Impact: SEC's Rule 15 under Regulation S-T


Abstract: A recent dramatic rise in the assets managed by passive corporate debt funds has profound implications for firm financing and payout policy. I use fund-specific flows to isolate exogenous increases in firm-level passive debt ownership at a firm. Firms respond to higher levels of passive debt ownership by increasing leverage, consistent with a recapitalization. More passive debt ownership does not lead to risk-shifting, but rather an increase in direct payouts to shareholders. I show that passive debt holders facilitate these effects by reducing aggregate ex-ante and ex-post monitoring. The presence of a bank monitor mitigates the relationship between passive debt ownership and increased payout.

Presentations: FMA Annual Meeting 2020, SFA Annual Meeting 2020





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